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massive surveillance of our digital existence, algorithmic
agents rank search results, filter our emails, hide and show
news items on social networks feeds, try to guess what
products we might buy next for ourselves and for others,
what movies we want to watch, and when we might be
pregnant. Algorithmic agents select, filter, and recommend
products, information, and people; they increasingly
customize our physical environments, including the
temperature and the mood. Increasingly, algorithmic
agents don't just select from the range of human created
alternatives, but also they create. Burgeoning algorithmic
agents are capable of providing us with content made just
for us, and engage with us through one-of-a-kind,
personalized interactions. Studying these algorithmic
agents presents a host of methodological, ethical, and
logistical challenges.
The objectives of our paper are two-fold. The first aim is to
describe one possible approach to researching the
individual and societal effects of algorithmic
recommenders, and to share our experiences with the
academic community. The second is to contribute to a more
fundamental discussion about the ethical and legal issues
of "tracking the trackers" as well as the costs and trade-offs
involved. Our paper will contribute to the discussion on the
relative merits, costs and benefits of different approaches to
ethically and legally sound research on algorithmic
governance. We will argue that besides shedding light on
how users interact with algorithmic agents, we also need to
be able to understand how different methods of monitoring
our algorithmically controlled digital environments
compare to each other in terms of costs and benefits. We
conclude our article with a number of concrete suggestions
for how to address the practical, ethical and legal
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I. INTRODUCTION
Algorithmic agents permeate every instant of our online
existence. As Artificial Intelligence research makes steady
advances, as sensors proliferate, and more and more data are
being accumulated and shared on data markets, the
effectiveness of algorithmic recommendations grows while the
costs of personalization drop. Consequently, many wonder if
there will still be a space in the future where we remain
insulated from direct or indirect exposure to algorithmic agents.
In the age of ubiquitous algorithmic agents, will there be still
spaces where we are not subjected to A/B tests, tailored
advertising, price discrimination, and content
recommendations? Will there be spaces in the future which are
not controlled, one way or another, by algorithmic agents, and
where technology is a neutral arbiter of rather than an active
agent in our interactions in and with our environment?
Technology, as always, is deployed before society had the
opportunity to come to terms with it. The lack of insight leads
to a sense of lost control, drawing anxious responses.10 Many see
algorithmic agents as black boxes," or rather, as black holes,
which utilize all available information and grow ever powerful,
but still remain invisible to human perception. Just like
astrophysicists, scholars of algorithmic agents try to evaluate
circumstantial evidence to understand how algorithmic agents
operate, but unlike natural scientists, the researchers who study
the sociological, political, economic, anthropological, ethical, and
legal aspects of algorithmic black boxes regard their object of
study as anything but natural or value-neutral. Algorithmic
agents, just like any other technology, are embedded in the
existing economic, social, and political conditions. They reflect
our implicit and explicit hopes and fears, ambitions and
shortcomings, and the social conditions in which they are
created and used.12 This means that, despite many techno-
10 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: How MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE
(2006); ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE: WHAT THE INTERNET IS HIDING FROM
YoU (2011); VAIRA VIKE-FREIBERGA ET AL., A FREE AND PLURALISTIC MEDIA TO
SUSTAIN EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY: THE REPORT OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP ON MEDIA
FREEDOM AND PLURALISM (2013); Malte Ziewitz, Governing Algorithms: Myth,
Mess, and Methods, 41 SCI., TECH., & HUMAN VALUES 3 (2015); Frederik J.
Borgesius Zuiderveen et al., Should we worry about filter bubbles? An
interdisciplinary inquiry into self-selected and pre-selected personalised
communication, 5 INTERNET POLICY REV. (2016).
11 Lucas D Introna, Algorithms, Governance, and Governmentality On Governing
Academic Writing, 41 SCI., TECH., & HUMAN VALUES 17 (2015).
12 To illustrate this point, it worth remembering the controversies around Google
seemingly serving racist search results and ads. See, for example, Latanya
Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery, 11 ACM QUEUE 10 (2013) for
discriminative ads served with queries for black sounding names. Despite the
popular press's descriptions of racist algorithms, Google's algorithmic agents
2017 136
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optimistic accounts,13 the discourse on algorithms also reflects
the fears and speculations on the adverse effects of algorithmic
agents. Strong arguments support the position that algorithmic
agents that operate without proper, or flawed, human oversight;
or absent of well-defined governance and ethical frameworks,
may have negative effects on greater societal norms and values
such as the holy triumvirate of libert, egalit, fraternit4-or to
put it in the language of the existing legal frameworks,
fundamental human rights and freedoms, equality, and social
cohesion.14
Responding to these background conditions, the
University of Amsterdam launched a research program to study
the effects of, and the normative considerations around, online
personalized services in the domains of news, politics, commerce,
and health communication. 15 This project has four major aims.
First, we hope to identify how algorithmic agents tailor news,
political communications, commercial offerings, and health-
related information. Second, we want to understand what
happens in the personalized and private information cocoons:
what information individuals are exposed to and how they
interact with algorithmic agents and their recommendations.
Third, through the synthesis of the observations of these
domains, we attempt to understand what societal effects result
from this personalization -- including fundamental social and
political changes.16 Finally, we seek to assess the results of our
empirical inquiries from a legal and normative perspective to
(or rather, its developers) hardly engage in deliberate racist behavior. Rather,
algorithms learn and reflect the values of their users.
13 See, e.g., NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL (1995).
14 Tal Zarsky, The Trouble with Algorithmic Decisions: An Analytic Road Map to
Examine Efficiency and Fairness in Automated and Opaque Decision Making,
41 SCI., TECH., & HUMAN VALUES 118 (2016).
15 The Personalized Communications project is a joint, multidisciplinary
initiative between the Institute for Information Law (IViR) and the
Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR) at the University of
Amsterdam. As the website states: "The objective of the Personalized
Communications initiative is to conduct empirical and normative research on
the uses, effects, and implications of personalized communication in the areas
of politics, health, and commerce." The Project, PERSONALIZED COMMUNICATION,
https://perma.cc/DCC5-9ML2 (last visited Dec. 3, 2016). This project focuses on
investigating "the uses and implications of personalized communication and
information" for individuals, society, and information law and policy. Id. The
program takes a normative-empirical perspective, creating an environment
and infrastructure for normative-empirical research and establishing itself as
a central knowledge hub for research in this domain.
16 High profile political events in 2016, such as Brexit, and the controversies
around the US presidential elections led to serious debates about the effect of
algorithmic recommenders on the access to and diversity of news; and the
fragmentation and/or polarization of public opinion. In the domain of
commerce, algorithmic agents may also unjustifiably discriminate certain
consumer groups.
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identify arguments and tools for possible policy interventions,
assuming the normative assessment provides adequate
justification for interference.17
Many would agree that these are pressing issues. But
how does one go about designing a research methodology for
such a project? Operationalizing this undertaking is no small
task and "tracking the trackers" poses a range of technical, legal,
and ethical challenges and trade-offs. In this article, we hope to
share our experiences, challenges, and possibly solutions
regarding the challenges of studying algorithmic agents in
digital communications.
The article is structured as follows. In Part II we argue
that our societies need to think seriously about how to do
research on algorithmic agents (or "AAs"). We describe the
stakes of this research and assess if our current approaches are
commensurable with those stakes. We then spell out what it
would take to stay in control of our AA-controlled digital
environments. In Part III, we give an overview of the current AA
research landscape and describe the technical, legal, ethical, and
practical difficulties associated with the different research
approaches. We also point out some of the fundamental ethical
and legal issues around researching algorithmic agents. In Part
IV, we describe a novel approach to AA research, which we
devised. We also detail how we addressed the previously-
mentioned technical, legal, and ethical design challenges. In the
conclusion, we summarize our experiences and lay the
groundwork for future research and actions. We argue that
besides shedding light on the internal workings of specific
algorithms, we also need to be able to understand how different
methods of AA research compare to each other in terms of costs
and benefits.
II. THE NEED FOR RESEARCH ON ALGORITHMIC
AGENTS
Algorithmic agents have unprecedented control over
multiple aspects of our society and lives. This is primarily due to
three recent developments in the domain of digital, networked
communications. First, it seems that contrary to all the wishful
thinking,18 the currently prevailing technological, commercial,
and political incentives are more likely to lead to a heavily
centralized communication infrastructure than to a
17 Id.
18 See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006).
2017 138
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decentralized one.19 In the last few years, we have witnessed the
emergence of a small number of extremely powerful
intermediaries - such as Facebook in social networking; Google
in searching, advertising, and mobile communications; Amazon
in online retail and cloud services; and Apple in mobile hardware
and software - which have managed to secure their dominant
positions in multiple global marketplaces.
The second trend is the increased reliance on algorithmic
software agents by intermediaries, big and small, to serve and
interact with their users and customers and to provide
personalized services for them. Google's PageRank algorithm
compiles our search results and manages our emails. Facebook's
newsfeed algorithm compiles our daily dose of news, friend
updates, and cat videos, effectively controlling both our news
diet and our social relations. Online shops recommend us goods
and try to guess our maximum willingness to pay. Recent
advances in Artificial Intelligence research and applications
suggest that we should expect algorithmic agents to be applied
to even more, currently human controlled domains.
Third, due to the proliferation of algorithmic
personalization, an increasing fraction of our digital experience
is unique to us, and unknown to others, isolating our digital
experiences into individual experience cocoons.
Taken together, these developments present us with
pressing challenges about how to stay in control of digital
environments which are increasingly co-habited and controlled
by opaque algorithmic agents, weaving nontransparent
personalized-experience-cocoons around individual users. This
non-transparency creates what we call an "algorithmic control
crisis", in which we need to solve multiple, deeply intertwined
problems that tend to lack well-tested theoretical,
methodological, and practical ways to address them.
This "control crisis" is the result of many factors. First,
our empirical knowledge of our algorithmically personalized
digital environment is fragmented and unmethodical: we lack
systematic insight into what is happening inside the individual
experience cocoons and how those events aggregate on a societal
level. Second, we the lack established benchmarks and
thresholds by which to measure and assess changes on the
individual and societal level, such as the diversity of
information-diets or the fragmentation of public discourse.
Third, we lack systematic research into the normative
implications of algorithmic control. Fourth and finally, we lack
19 Jean-Christophe Plantin et al., Infrastructure studies meet platform studies in
the age of Google and Facebook, NEW MEDIA & Soc. 1 (2016),
https://perma.cc/CGV9-55L9.
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research on the effectiveness of current legal and policy tools to
control algorithmic agents, the contexts in which they are
deployed, and the interactions they are engaged in.
The scope of this paper is limited. We intend to reflect
upon the first challenge, and the first challenge alone: on the
fragmentation of our knowledge of algorithmically controlled,
personalized information environments. This fragmented
knowledge landscape poses particular challenges to researchers
attempting to study the effects algorithmic agents.
Our individual experience of algorithmically
personalized services is by definition unique and differs from
everyone else's experiences by an unknown degree. Our
experiences are also private: in most cases, individual users are
alone in those situations where they are exposed to personalized
services.20 Taken together, this means that non-transparent
algorithmic personalization agents create non-transparent,
unique experience cocoons that remain unknown - perhaps even
unknowable - and thus incommensurable for everyone else. We
can neither take for granted that our neighbors have the same
exposure to the world as we do, nor be sure what others are
exposed to.
This creates an unprecedented level of information
asymmetry for the individual and for society. The individual is
losing the guidance that the evening TV news, the front page of
the daily newspaper, the campaign poster, or the shop-window
on the high street provided on others' experiences. Society, on
the other hand, has yet to develop a capacity to monitor what is
happening inside the opaque algorithms, or in the fragmented
experience bubbles, and aggregate them into a meaningful
whole. The same non-transparency that prevents the individual
from trusting the existence of a shared experience with others
prevents society as a whole from creating an aggregate view of
what is happening in those personalized experience cocoons. The
result is that we lose sight of what is happening to us in the era
of personalized algorithmic recommendations.
This lost perspective undermines the ability to self-reflect
-- and to change course if necessary. Policy, regulation, and
control hinge on our ability to monitor information. There is, of
course, always an inherent information asymmetry between the
regulator and the market, but how big that asymmetry is, and
how difficult it is to bridge, varies. Take for example traditional
20 Personalization is usually based on data collected on the individual user,
aggregated into individual user profiles. There are some probable exceptions
to that, such as a Netflix profile, which aggregates preferences on a household
level, but shared consumption of personalized services is the exception to the
rule of the atomized consumer.
2017 140
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media markets, which seem to have been very transparent
compared to what we have today. Information on the supply
side: on media products, on their owners, on their employees, on
their circulation, on their audience, on their advertisers, and on
their potential income was more or less in the public domain, or
very cheap to produce. Information gathering at the demand
side, at the consumers level, was not much more difficult, as
private companies (like Nielsen, or GfK) and public institutions
(like the National Bureaus of Statistics) have been conducting
systematic, longitudinal, and representative studies on media
consumption. However, our societies lack anything even
remotely similar for the digital, personalized media. When it
comes to the aforementioned digital intermediaries, we as a
society have no idea what information and ads individuals are
exposed to: we have no way of knowing how that information
was selected for them; we do not know whether there is a human
editor who edits information streams, and if there is, who he/she
might be; and even producers, whose content is being relayed,
have only very limited information on who their audience is,
while the public has almost no insight into the transactions and
information flows on these platforms. The incentives are
structured so that whatever limited information stakeholders
have on the personalized, digital media market, the information
will not be shared, so any meta-information on these markets
remains extremely fragmented state, if in any state at all.
Personalized digital media is not the first market to
suffer from such structural information asymmetry: banking, for
example, is also historically and structurally non-transparent.
For personalized digital media, however, in the foreseeable
future we will continue to lack the tools that emerged to provide
public oversight of the financial system: statutory transparency
obligations, stress tests, and independent audits. Yet, given the
power of these digital intermediaries, there is an immediate and
pressing need for information so we have a chance to understand
what is happening to us, our neighbors, and our societies in the
rapidly evolving, increasingly dominant, AA-assisted,
personalized digital media environment.
The central position of non-transparent algorithmic
agents in our media environments creates the urgent need for
research into these agents and their effects. This need has
prompted a fresh wave of research into the methods of auditing
those algorithmic agents. In the next section, we describe the
current landscape of AA audit approaches.
141
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III. THE STATE OF RESEARCH INTO
ALGORITHMIC AGENTS: THE AUDIT APPROACH IN
PERSONALIZED MEDIA RESEARCH, AND BEYOND
A. The Algorithm Audit Approach
The initial reaction to the emergence of algorithmic
agents was to demand algorithmic transparency via the audit of
algorithms. Several different algorithm audit approaches were
proposed21 to shed light to the inner workings of non-transparent
and complex algorithmic agents:
Audit of disclosed code (Algorithm Transparency).22 This
approach operates under the assumption that the public or
select individuals have full access to the source code of the
algorithmic agent, and thus it is possible to review what kinds
of input variables it uses and how these inputs are being used to
produce its output. Subsequent studies identified many
limitations of this approach: algorithms cannot be separated
from the datasets they use and the applications they are used
for; discriminatory algorithmic decisions are hardly hard-coded,
and may be the emergent properties of the machine learning
process, not identifiable from the review of code; full code
transparency may actually aid the abuse of the algorithms by
malevolent agents, and so on. In any case, there are very few
algorithmic agents whose full code is available for review either
by the public or by a closed group of experts. Even the most
transparent companies in this domain (such as Reddit) keep
parts of their code closed to avoid abuse.23
Not having direct access to the algorithmic agent itself,
the other alternative is to study its outputs, while, if possible,
strategically manipulating its inputs to reverse engineer how
different outputs depend on the changes of inputs. Scraping
audits use the public interfaces, or APIs, of algorithmic agents
to feed them particular information and analyze the outputs.
However, in most cases, such APIs are non-existent or have
severe limitations. In those cases researchers conduct "sock
21 The two most important contributions, on which the following section is based,
are Christian Sandvig et al., Auditing Algorithms: Research Methods for
Detecting Discrimination on Internet Platforms, Paper Presented to "Data and
Discrimination: Converting Critical Concerns into Productive Inquiry," A Pre-
Confrence at the 64th Annual Meeting of the International Communication
Association (May 22, 2014), https://perma.cc/V5T8-WQKC; and Rob Kitchin,
Thinking Critically About and Researching Algorithms, The Programmable
City Working Paper 5 *1 (Oct. 28, 2014).
22 Sandvig, supra note 21, at 9-10.
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puppet audits." This method entails often sophisticated software
and hardware infrastructureS24 designed to emulate certain
aspects of user behavior in relation to algorithmic agents. Such
infrastructures are usually able to control variables researchers
think may be relevant inputs for the algorithmic agents, such as
usage histories, technical parameters (browser and operating
system type), geolocation, etc. Though recent years brought
significant improvements in the sophistication of the audit
infrastructure,2 5 simulated users may or may not be adequate
approximations of real-life users. While such puppet audits may
yield noteworthy results of how artificial changes in the
synthetic profiles result in changes in the algorithmic agents
output, without proper benchmark against real-life users, it is
impossible to say whether those observed effects are
generalizable beyond those artificially created contexts.
The solution to the shortcomings of sock puppet audits is
to observe how algorithmic agents react to the inputs of real-life
users. In Crowdsourced / Collaborative Audits, real user-
algorithmic agent interactions are observed, and the pre-
existing profiles, browsing histories, technology fingerprints,
and other organically developed profile information are used.
However, this proximity to reality comes at a cost. First, in real-
world observation, it is often problematic to control for
independent variables and differences in conditions. In addition,
recruiting a large enough sample that is representative and
diverse in those dimensions in which algorithmic discrimination
or unjust profiling might be a relevant issue is costly and
difficult. Finally, and maybe most challenging, studying
algorithms in their relationship to "real" humans raises a host
of legal and ethical issues, which we will describe in more detail
in the next section.
Finally, a number of qualitative approaches can help
researchers uncover the context in which algorithmic agents are
designed, deployed, and interacted with. The full socio-technical
assemblage around algorithmic agents,26 or "networked
information algorithms,"27 interpret algorithms in their wider
contexts of the conditions of code development and deployment,
usage, interfaces, and data, as well as the normative, legal,
organizational, economic, political, and cultural frameworks in
which code is situated and may be interpreted. Unpacking the
full sociotechnical assemblages of algorithms may be difficult to
24 For a description of such an infrastructure, see Steven Englehardt et al.,
OpentWPM: An automated platform for web privacy measurement (Mar. 15,
2015), https://perma.cc/S2G4-F74H.
25 Id.
26 Kitchin, supra note 21, at *7-13, *21.
27 Mike Ananny, Toward an Ethics of Algorithms Convening, Observation,
Probability, and Timeliness, 41 SCI., TECH. & HUmAN VALUES 93 (2015).
143
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achieve due to the complexity of these assemblages, but partial
reconstructions may be possible through the (auto)ethnographic
studies of their genesis or the observation of algorithmic agents'
operation in their native contexts. When engaged in reflexively
producing code, researchers "reflectH on and critically
interrogate[ their own experiences of translating and
formulating an algorithm."28 Such studies provide insight into
the legal, ethical, institutional, socio-technical contexts in which
code development needs to be situated. Rather than conducting
auto-ethnography, it is also possible to conduct ethnographic
studies on the coding teams. Examining the professional teams
deploying algorithms may reveal how different decisions shape
the ways algorithmic agents are developed, customized to
specific tasks, or deployed in light of different technological,
editorial, and business considerations.29
B. Beyond the Audit of Algorithms: Inquiry Into the
User
Most, if not all, of the currently dominant,
aforementioned research strategies focus on the algorithm itself.
They all rest of the premise that one way or another it is
sensible, possible, and effective to model how algorithmic
recommendations are produced, so they can be subjected to what
is essentially a supply-side analysis. It is hoped that this way
algorithmic agents can be subjected to an a priori (deontological)
ethical scrutiny (do they have the appropriate ethical guidelines
encoded?), or to a teleological critique to test whether these
agents produce legally and ethically acceptable results.30 As we
have seen, even with a fully transparent code, the inner
workings of an algorithmic agent may remain unintelligible for
humans, making the a priori scrutiny hard, if not impossible.
The consequentialist approach would require us to model all
possible users and all possible circumstances to account for all
the possibilities that might arise. This also seems rather difficult
to achieve. In addition, in both cases the results would remain
detached from what is actually happening to flesh and blood
humans under very specific and real conditions.
The alternative to the study of algorithms is the study of
the effects of algorithmic agents on individual users. Individual
users engage with algorithmic agents every day; they use and
abuse, cheat, resist, play with and subvert what algorithms are
28 Kitchin, supra note 21, at *18.
29 Mike Ananny & Kate Crawford, A Liminal Press: Situating New App Designers
Within a Field of Networked News Production, 3 DIG. JOURNALISM 192 (2015),
https://perma.cc/F4ZA-UYK3 (last visited Nov 18, 2016).
30 Ananny, supra note 27.
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and offer. The personalized experience cocoons around each
individual are the products of these interactions between
humans and algorithmic agents. Contrary to the algorithm-
audit approach, personalized experience cocoons are not specific
to any particular algorithmic agent, but they reflect the whole
spectrum of online and offline, personalized and non-
personalized information flows.
To illustrate this point, take, for example, news
personalization. Despite the recent growth in news
personalization, personalized sources likely constitute only a
small share of a person's news diet, especially if we factor in
other news media, such as television, radio and print. On the
other hand, heavily personalized services, such as social
networks and search engines, are significant traffic drivers for
personalized news sites. Any research that hopes to reconstruct
the effects of news personalization, must be able to observe all
of the distinct, but closely interrelated, personalized and non-
personalized online and offline domains that account for the
news diet of the individual, and shape individuals' implicit and
explicit personalization choices.
For these reasons we argue that rather than looking at
algorithmic agents in isolation, we need to focus on the co-
development of non-personalized media, algorithmic
personalization agents, and users. The individuals who interact
with algorithmic agents - who rely on, ignore, or resist
personalized recommendations - are not the passive victims of
algorithmic agents, but key stakeholders, with full agency.
These interactions both shape the algorithmic agents, and
produce information on their workings. Only through the
aggregation of these individual observations can one fully view
the actual individual and societal benefits and harms of
algorithmic personalization.
This requires the direct, systematic, automated
observation of the online activities of internet users. Not having
access to the information that is being gathered at the
intermediaries, monitoring the digital information environment
of a representative population sample is the second best - and
perhaps only - way to reconstruct the individual and societal
effects of algorithmic interference in our information flows.
This approach, however, creates an almost unresolvable
paradox. Studying the processes of dataveillance,31 digital
profiling, and the algorithmic control of information and users is
impossible without interfering with the privacy of the
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individuals under monitoring. Even if such monitoring is
limited, voluntary, and complies with the highest legal and
ethical standards, it would capture massive amounts of personal
data. Needless to say, this raises serious privacy, data
protection, and ethical issues. In other words, those who wish to
study algorithmic agents have to reflect on an unavoidable
challenge: we can only achieve the benefits of understanding the
societal effects of algorithmic agents by surveilling individual
users, and thus interfering with individual rights and liberties.
IV. THE CHALLENGES OF DESIGNING AN
ALTERNATIVE: ROBIN - OUR MONITORING TOOL
FOR ALGORITHMICALLY PERSONALIZED DIGITAL
MEDIA
In this Part, we present an overview of the challenges to
balancing these individual and societal interests. We do so
through a self-reflexive account of developing our own
alternative to the approaches described above: "Robin," a
custom-built browser plug-in designed to collect information
about the effects of algorithmic agents.
We present this as a type of auto-ethnography, which
attempts to unpack the full socio-technical assemblage around
our own attempts to observe the algorithmic society, and around
the scientific, technical, ethical, and organizational
considerations we took during the development process.
We first present the design of the technology to monitor
individual information cocoons - that is, how Robin actually
works. We then address the ethical, legal and organizational
challenges and concerns related to this approach.
A. The Technical Design of Robin
In order to study what happens in personalized
information cocoons, we need to capture all relevant types of
information exchanged between a consenting subject's internet
browser and all online services that might play a role in
dataveillance, profiling, and personalization. For that reason,
we developed a software tool to intercept data traffic between
the browser and the internet. The tool, Robin, is a custom-built
browser plugin, which routes the data stream generated by the
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internet browser of the user through an enhanced proxy server32
where the data stream is copied, filtered, and stored. This setup
(which resembles a Man-In-The-Middle setup - though of course
without the malicious intent and the subsequent theft of
personal data) enables us to observe either directly or indirectly
all the elements of personalization and algorithmic
recommendation. First, we are able to capture every piece of
information that a user may knowingly or unknowingly expose
to online services via various online trackers, beacons, cookies,
hardware and software fingerprints, IP addresses, etc. Second,
we are able to see which pieces of information the individual is
exposed to: what news items he or she sees; what his or her
search queries produce; what ads he or she is being served; what
prices he or she receives, etc. Finally, we are able to capture user
interaction in terms of comments, likes, shares, follow up-
searches, etc.
o arequests to non-whitelisted URLs
reach their destination uninterrupted
Internet traffic is intercepted and copied
Sensitive personal and 3rd party data is filtered
Sanitized data is securely stored for further analysis
Figure 1: Basic schemata of the observation
infrastructure
The monitoring relies on a crowdsourced / collaborative
approach: we planned to recruit 1600 participants from a well-
32 We use an enhanced transparent proxy, which serves as an 'invisible' link in
the chain of computers between a user and a website, through which all the
traffic of all the participants flows through. We added extra functionality to
reserve the privacy of our users.
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established social science survey panel33 to install the plugin.
This way we could rely on the existing browsing histories and, if
authenticated, pre-existing online profiles of participating users,
and we can also survey non-visible characteristics such as
participant attitudes.
This relatively simple technical design allows us to
capture all data algorithmic agents use and produce. The
difficult part was to define the data we did not want to collect;
to define, circumscribe, and filter out sensitive, unnecessary
and/or private data from the captured data stream. On the one
hand, we need enough data to be able to reconstruct what
happens in those isolated experience cocoons. But on the other,
this has to be done in a manner compliant with European legal
requirements and consistent with the high ethical standards of
the project. The real challenge is thus how to balance data
collection with the protection of respondents' privacy, personal
data, and security. These are addressed below.
B. Robin: The Challenge of Design and
Implementation
Our drive towards collecting more data is moderated by
several additional external and internal factors. First, we are
constrained by external data needs regarding what information
we sought to collect. Built-in technological roadblocks limit what
is physically possible to collect. The existing legal frameworks
around, for instance, privacy, data protection, and copyright
define the rigid external limits of what can legally be collected.
The panel constraints include limitations set by the research
company, which is responsible for the prolonged existence of
their research panel, and the individual sensibilities of the panel
respondents, who can reject participation if they find the terms
unacceptable or the compensation insufficient. Finally, our
formal (as embodied in institutional ethical review boards) and
informal ethical considerations hape our research.
1. Data needs when studying personalized communication
33 Centerdata administered the LISS panel, a publicly funded research panel set
up to enable social science studies in the Netherlands. This is similar to the
US-based Knowledge Networks. The study used the LISS panel. The role of
Centerdata is to assemble a sample of users who are willing to install our
browser plugin; inform users about the research, obtain their informed and
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There are two considerations that define the breadth and
scope of data required to reliably consider the normative
implications of algorithmic personalization: (1) the spectrum of
interactions that may directly or indirectly shape algorithmic
personalization; (2) the constitution of the observed group that
allow for the generalization of findings.
The study of how people interact with algorithmic agents
must rely on two distinct types of information. First, we need to
understand what is happening to the individual users within the
algorithmically personalized experience cocoons: what kinds of
data are collected about them, what kind of profiles are being
built, how those profiles are translated into actual algorithmic
decisions, and what kind of interactions follow those algorithmic
decisions. Second, to piece together the whole picture of the
digital public sphere, researchers must also have information on
user practices, interactions, activities which do not directly
involve algorithmic agents, but are relevant in the context of, for
example, news consumption. Consequently, researchers who
intend to understand how profiling and targeting works, and
whether it leads to (unintentional) biases, are faced with the
puzzle that in order to draw conclusions, they need to obtain
even more data than any particular profiler in isolation. For
example, the aforementioned sock-puppet based approach,
which is the preferred method of computer scientists to reverse
engineer algorithmic decision-making in the context of a
particular algorithm, does not enable the reconstruction of the
diffusion of news as users fluidly move between personalized and
non-personalized domains.
We do not believe that it is possible to achieve this level
of oversight with a single tool. For example, to measure potential
effects of exposure to personalized news use, and to test if people
become more knowledgeable due to personalized news use
(because, for instance, the news selected for them perfectly
matches their interest and cognitive capabilities), additional
data are needed, that must, for example, be collected through an
online knowledge test in a quasi-experimental setting. For these
reasons we make intensive use of surveys, interviews, and focus
group discussions to complement the data collected through
Robin.
The second issue concerns the generalizability of
findings. Ultimately, the goal of this research is to generate
generalizable insights. This means it is important that our
findings be translatable to other users in other circumstances.
To meet this goal, it is essential that we do not collect data
among a small selective group of users, but that we draw a
relatively large random sample of the overall population. If we
find that the mechanisms we identify are comparable among all
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segments of the population, we can assume that they are
generalizable and similar results can and will be found if the
research is carried out again. It also means that the causal
mechanisms and patterns we find hold empirical relevance
which is significant for the legitimacy of any future legal
intervention.
2. Technological roadblocks
In theory, we face very few technical restrictions on the
data we can collect on the online behavior of our panel
participants. By inserting ourselves between the browser and
the internet, we are in a position to observe all data sent and
received by the browser, including encrypted information, which
we decrypt, save, filter and re-encrypt at the proxy. By having
access to the browser framework, in theory we can also use the
data generated by other components of the computer: capture
mouse movements, access data generated by the camera, the
microphone, etc.
At the time of publication, our approach covers PCs, but
excludes mobile equipment, such as smart phones and tablets,
and smart TVs and other appliances. That is our most important
limitation, as mobile devices command an ever-increasing share
of our online time. The technological constraints of mobile
platforms and smart appliances (the general lockdown of
devices, lack of browser plugins, the proliferation of apps that
are kept strictly isolated from each other to prevent data leakage
and protect user privacy, etc.) severely limit the ability of third
parties to track what people do on such devices. With properly
configured devices,34 however, the transparent proxy approach
has the potential to observe user activity on currently
inaccessible devices.
The main technological roadblock is not how to observe
certain user interactions, but how to filter out data we do not
want to capture. There are two technological instruments to
define what is captured and what is not. First, websites that we
want to observe are placed on a whitelist which limit the scale
and magnitude of the data collection to what we deem necessary
in the light of the research questions. Consequently, data is only
routed through the transparent proxy if the user visits a
whitelisted website.
In addition, all data is filtered for certain categories of
personal data which we identified as highly sensitive personal
34 The pre-configuration of devices is necessary, for example, to route all or
selected traffic through a proxy, and capture encrypted data traffic.
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data. For example, passwords, credit card data and other
financial information, personal correspondence, and personal
data of individuals who did not consent to being observed are
among those data that needs to be filtered out in order to comply
with legal and ethical requirements. Tailor-made filters,
designed to fit the particulars of each observed website are the
second set of technological instruments we employ to limit the
invasive nature of our research and comply with the legal and
ethical restrictions.
3. Relevant legal and ethical frameworks
Thus, the largest constraints are legal and ethical. This
Section introduces the requirements stemming from legislation
on personal data protection and explains how these
requirements influenced our approach to collecting and using
participants' personal data.35
a) Complying with EU Data Protection Law
The European Union (EU) vests a high level of legal
protection to an individual's personal data. Scientific research in
the EU and the US acknowledges similar ethical values. But
EU-based research must adhere to the EU rules on privacy and
personal data - rules that are different than privacy rules in the
US.36 For instance, the notion of "personal data", a legal term in
EU law, differs from what would be considered personal
identifiable information in US law.37
In European constitutional law, the right to private life -
commonly referred to as the right to privacy - has the status of
a fundamental right under Article 8 of the European Convention
35 Research with consenting participants into online personalized services in the
Netherlands must comply with relevant legal and ethical frameworks.
However, the intended observation of participants' exposure to online
personalized services can also potentially conflict with intellectual property
law and contract law, which we have kept outside the scope of this paper.
36 For a review of the US legal environment, see David R. O'Brien et al.,
Integrating Approaches to Privacy Across the Research Lifecycle: When Is
Information Purely Public? (The Berkman Center for Internet & Society at
Harvard University, Research Publication No. 2015-7, 2015).,
https://perma.cc/PY8U-LN96.
37 Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New
Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1877-
78 (2011); Frederik J. Zuiderveen Borgesius, Singling Out People Without
Knowing Their Names - Behavioural Targeting, Pseudonymous Data, and the
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on Human RightS38 and Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union (EU Charter).39
The EU is exceptional in that the EU Charter, entering
into force in 2009, grants each person a fundamental right o the
protection of personal data concerning him or her. Article 8
provides that personal data "must be processed fairly for
specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person
concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law." This
right is fortified by granting individuals the right to access their
personal data and, if inaccurate, to have the data rectified.
EU data protection law, which aims for complete and
effective protection of these fundamental rights, regulates in
detail the responsibilities and rights in connection with the
handling of personal data. Today, the use of personal data is
governed by the 1995 Data Protection Directive,40 which EU
Member States implemented into their national legislation. In
the Netherlands, where the research project is based, the
implementing law is the Dutch Data Protection Act, which has
to be observed when processing personal data.4 1
The legal framework will change in the near future. In
May 2018, the EU's General Data Protection Regulation will
enter into force and repeal the Directive.42 As an EU regulation,
the General Data Protection Regulation will become directly
applicable law in the Member States. The new regulation is
bound to change the situation of scientific research because it
treats this purpose as desirable for society.
EU data protection law applies almost without exception
to personal data used in the course of scientific research.43 The
legal requirements for scientific research involving personal
data in EU member states are different from US human subject
38 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230 [hereinafter European Convention
on Human Rights or ECHR].
39 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 7, 2000 O.J. (C 364)
1.
40 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data 1995 O.J. (L 281)
31[hereinafter Data Protection Directive].
41 Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens [Personal Data Protection Act], Stb. 2000,
302 (Neth.).
42 See Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and
repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter General Data
Protection Regulation or GDPR].
43 The exception for scientific research, which is explained later in the article,
provides a legal basis only for the reuse of lawfully collected personal data.
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research regulations.44 Notably, in EU Member States it would
not make a difference if research uses exclusively public
information because data protection law applies whenever
personal data are used.45
In the following, we map out how, in our effort to comply
with local laws, we had to adjust our research methodology and
infrastructure. In doing so, we also explain some key concepts of
EU data protection law.
Data protection law is triggered whenever 'personal data'
are collected or otherwise processed.4 6 Personal data are defined
as "any information relating to an identified or identifiable
natural person ('data subject); an identifiable person is one who
can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference
to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to
his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social
identity."4 7 The new General Data Protection Regulation
explicitly mentions "online identifier" and "location data" as
examples of identifiers.48
Whether the definition of personal data is met depends
on the circumstances of the situation. Merely changing a name
to a number is generally not sufficient to render personal data
"anonymous" and to remain outside of the scope of data
protection law. This wide scope of data protection law is often
overlooked in the practice; there is frequent confusion and
discussion about the notions of "pseudonymous" and
"anonymous" data.49
In brief, personal data can relate to a person even if no
name is attached, as long as the data are not aggregated to the
stage that they cannot be linked anymore with reasonable effort
to the individual. Removing the name from a file and replacing
it with a number, which then is stored in a separate file, does
not in itself make the data being anonymous. Rather, such data
have been pseudonymized.50 And pseudonymized data still fall
44 See 45 C.F.R. § 46.
45 See Case C-131/12 Google Spain SLv. Agencia Espatiola de Protecci6n de Datos
(2014).
46 Processing is defined very broadly. See Data Protection Directive art. 2(b).
47 Id. art 2(a).
48 See General Data Protection Regulation art. 4(1).
49 See generally about the scope of the personal data definition: Frederik J.
Zuiderveen Borgesius, Singling Out People Without Knowing Their Names -
Behavioural Targeting, Pseudonymous Data, and the New Data Protection
Regulation, 32 COMPUTER LAW & SECURITY REVIEW 256 (2016); see also Gerrit-
Jan Zwenne, De Verwaterde Privacywet [Diluted Privacy Law], Inaugural
lecture of Professor Dr. G. J. Zwenne to the office of Professor of Law and the
Information Society at the University of Leiden on Friday (Apr. 12, 2013),
https://perma.cc/W7KW-J546..
50 See General Data Protection Regulation art. 4(5):
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under EU data protection law, unlike anonymized data.5 1 For
data to be truly anonymized, the data would need to be altered
in a way that it is not any longer possible to trace them back to
an identified or identifiable natural person.52
Thus, in our research we handle participants' personal
data and consequently data protection law fully applies to our
research. Moreover, we aim to collect website traffic, revealing
participants' news consumption, health-related information,
commercial transactions, and exposure to targeted ads. Such
website traffic can disclose, or at least suggest, an individual's
political opinions, or give information on users' level of fitness
and health condition. This implies that we collect "special
categories of data". For such "special categories of data", the
rules are stricter. In fact, processing such special categories of
data is in principle prohibited.
However, this in-principle prohibition can be overridden
in a few narrowly defined circumstances, or with the informed
and 'explicit' consent of the research participant (data subject).53
Scientific research is not mentioned as an exception yet and
thus, for the intended observation of participants' exposure to
online personalized services, we have to obtain the participant's
consent.
In summary, our study clearly falls within the bounds of
existing EU law. Thus, we must ensure that we comply with the
core data protection principles embodied in the legislation.
These are addressed in turn.
i) Data Minimization
Under the principle of data minimization, personal data
must be "not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they
'pseudonymisation' means the processing of personal data in such
a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed
to a specific data subject without the use of additional
information, provided that such additional information is
kept separately and is subject to technical and organisational
measures to ensure that the personal data are not attributed
to an identified or identifiable natural person.
51 Id.
52 The Article 29 Working Party has defined anonymous data as: "any
information relating to a natural person where the person cannot be identified,
whether by the data controller or by any other person, taking account of all the
means likely reasonably to be used either by the controller or by any other
person to identify that individual." Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 4/2007
on the concept of personal data, (June 20, 2007), https://perma.cc/L4TR-
EDKL; see also Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 05/2014 on anonymisation
techniques (Apr. 10, 2014), https:/perma.cc/HZT6-B7EV.
53 Data Protection Directive art. 8(2)(a).
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are collected and/or further processed."54 This data minimization
requirement clashes with collecting as much research data as
possible. Hence, as researchers we will have to define what
personal data we need to collect in relation to a specific research
purpose. A bulk data collection approach without a data
minimization strategy would breach the data minimization
principle. We thus need to develop ways to justify what we
collect, which we do in the form of a white list and customized
filters to minimize data capture, further described below.
ii) Storage Limitation
According to the storage limitation principle, personal
data must be "kept in a form which permits identification of data
subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which
the data were collected or for which they are further processed." 5
From a research perspective, there are actually good
reasons to store data indefinitely. For instance, storing data
indefinitely makes sense, because we might think of new
research questions later. If doubts ever arise about research
results, researchers want to be able to provide doubters with the
original data set. If applied too narrowly, the legal requirement
of storage limitation conflicts with the ethical expectation of data
openness for accountability and the reproducibility of results.
Our research design takes a rolling approach to the question of
how long the pseudonymized dataset will be kept and
maintained by stipulating that the unprocessed personal data
will be deleted five years after the last publication was
published.
iii) Purpose Limitation
The purpose limitation principle requires that personal
data must be "collected for specified, explicit and legitimate
purposes and not further processed in a way incompatible with
those purposes."56 The purpose limitation principle, a core data
protection principle, has several implications for the research
project.
First, the purpose limitation principle makes it illegal to
release (without a participant's consent) personal data as 'open
data', as far as 'open data' implies that anyone can use the data
for any purpose.5 7 We can, however, disclose aggregated data
sets, such as regression tables, as such data sets do not qualify
54 Data Protection Directive art. 6(1)(c).
56 Id., art. 6(1)(e).
56 Id., art. 6(1)(b).
57 See generally Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, Jonathan Gray & Mireille van
Eechoud, Open Data, Privacy, and Fair Information Principles: Towards a
Balancing Framework, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 2073, 2132 (2015).
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as personal data. But there is much public and scientific interest
in 'open data': making datasets collected by scientists (who are
tax-funded) available for other scientists.5 8 Access to scientific
and research data is possible today because the EU legal
framework has an exception that allows, under certain
circumstances, further data processing for scientific research.5 9
However, the General Data Protection Regulation might
introduce additional obligations for researchers, in addition to
clarifying the safeguards that researchers must put in place
when handling personal data.60
Second, the purpose limitation principle requires that the
purpose of collecting and using personal data be defined in
advance. Hence, we need to precisely define the collection
purpose, which can be challenging seeing that this a multi-year,
multi-project research initiative in which we seek to create a
research infrastructure without necessarily knowing all possible
research questions in advance. The new European Data
Protection Regulation explicitly recognizes that "ilt is often not
possible to fully identify the purpose of personal data processing
for scientific research purposes at the time of data collection."61
Therefore, data subjects should be allowed to give their consent
to certain areas of scientific research when in keeping with
recognized ethical standards for scientific research. The
regulation leaves it to the member states to describe specific
research exemptions, providing they arrange necessary
safeguards.62 We defined the purpose of data collection as
"research into the effects of personalized communication."
58 See, e.g., Data Access & Research Transparency, DA-RT,
https://perma.cc/LEH9-JSVB_ (last visited Nov. 30, 2016).
59 See Data Protection Directive art. 6(1)(b).
60 General Data Protection Regulation art. 5(1)(b); see also art. 89(1).
61 Id. recital 33.
62 Id. recital 23. "Member States should be authorised to provide, under specific
conditions and in the presence of appropriate safeguards for data subjects,
specifications and derogations to the information requirements, rectification,
erasure, to be forgotten, restriction of processing and on the right to data
portability and the right to object when processing personal data for archiving
purposes in the public interest, or scientific and historical research purposes
or statistical purposes. The conditions and safeguards in question may entail
specific procedures for data subjects to exercise those rights if this is
appropriate in the light of the purposes sought by the specific processing along
with technical and organisational measures aimed at minimising the
processing of personal data in pursuance of the proportionality and necessity
principles." See also art. 83 ("Processing of personal data for archiving
purposes in the public interest, or scientific and historical research purposes
or statistical purposes, shall be subject to in accordance with this Regulation
appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of the data subject. These
safeguards shall ensure that technical and organisational measures are in
place in particular in order to ensure the respect of the principle of data
minimisation. These measures may include pseudonymisat ion, as long as
these purposes can be fulfilled in this manner. Whenever these purposes can
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Finally, the purpose limitation principle requires that
personal data be collected for "legitimate purposes." This phrase
refers to the requirement in EU data protection law for data
controllers (data users) to have a "legal ground" or "legal basis"
to process personal data. In principle, there are six legal bases
that data controllers can rely on to process personal data. But
our research can only rely on the data subject's informed
consent.63 In our project we collect "special categories of data",
which, in short, can only be lawfully processed if the data subject
has given his or her "explicit consent", or when a specified
exception applies, for instance for hospitals or political parties.6
iv) Informed Consent
Moreover, installing a browser plug-in qualifies as "the
storing of information, or the gaining of access to information
already stored, in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user"
to which additional rules apply. Under the e-Privacy Directive,
storing or accessing information on a user's device is only
allowed after the individual's informed consent.65
Thus, the only available legal basis to collect data about
an individual's browsing activity, and to further process those
data, is to obtain a participant's "explicit consent." The
requirements for valid consent are rather detailed and strict in
Europe. Consent requires a "freely given specific and informed
indication of his wishes by which the data subject signifies his
agreement to personal data relating to him being processed."6 In
brief, valid consent cannot be obtained through the fine print in
terms and conditions, and tacit consent (for instance with an opt-
out system) is not sufficient.6 7 In other words, research
participants will need to be informed explicitly and extensively
about the data types we collect, for which purpose, what their
rights are regarding that data, etc.
Informed consent is likely the only viable legitimate
ground to base our research on. However, this approach is far
from ideal: a consent form that is too detailed may confuse
panelists, overburden them with difficult information, and may
be fulfilled by further processing of data which does not permit or not any
longer permit the identification of data subjects these purposes shall be
fulfilled in this manner.").
63 See Data Protection Directive art. 7.
64 Id., art. 8.
65 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July
2002 Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy
in the Electronic Communications Sector (Directive on Privacy and Electronic
Communications) 2002 O.J. (L 201) 1, htts://ierma~ec/C54R-XVKB art. 5(3).
66 Data Protection Directive art. 2(h).
67 See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 15/2011 on the
definition of consent, (July 13, 2011), https://perma.cc/H6CC-7Y4D.
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even scare them away. Moreover, there is a growing body
scholarship that questions of the usefulness and effectiveness of
consent requests.68
v) Security
Finally, data protection law provides that data controllers, such
as a university, must secure the data appropriately.69 Often, the
available research infrastructure at universities is not fully in
tune with the law's security requirements, meaning additional
measures must be taken to ensure that the transmission and
storage of personal data in the course of scientific research
complies with the law.
b) Complying with Research Ethics
The legal requirements mentioned above are not the only
constraints, however. Research ethics add extra layers of
complexity to the problem. Research and educational
organizations, their organizational units, and funders (such as
the EU's H2020 program70) all have ethical guidelines, review
procedures and boards, and institutional and procedural
safeguards. It is important to note, though, that empirical
research in legal scholarship has less history than, for example,
the social sciences, and thus the research ethics review
infrastructure process is still nascent. Therefore, tensions can
arise at levels as basic as attribution and the qualification of
authorship or the acceptability of different sources of funding,
but also at more organizational (e.g., different oversight
committees and cultures) as well as substantive levels (e.g.,
potential conflicts between research ethical requirements and
data protection law).
An interdisciplinary project such as ours that integrates
communication science with legal research raises particular
issues for ethics review. Currently, every social scientific data
collection effort carried out at the University of Amsterdam is
overseen by an ethics board. In addition, the project must pass
68 See, e.g., FREDERIK J. ZUIDERVEEN BORGESIUS, IMPROVING PRIVACY PROTECTION
IN THE AREA OF BEHAVIOURAL TARGETING (2015); Solon Barocas & Helen
Nissenbaum, On Notice: The Trouble with Notice and Consent, PROC. OF THE
ENGAGING DATA FORUM: THE FIRST INTL FORUM ON THE APPLICATION AND MGMT.
OF PERSONAL ELECTRONIC INFO. (Oct. 2009); Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-
Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1879 (2013);
Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, What Can Behavioral Economics
Teach Us About Privacy? in DIGITAL PRIVACY: THEORY, TECHNOLOGIES AND
PRACTICES 363 (Alessandro Acquisti, et al. eds, 2007).
69 See Data Protection Directive art. 17(1).
70 The H2020 Framework of the European Union is a large-scale research
program, funding basic and applied research in every scientific domain. See
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the ethical review board of the EU research funding body, which
conducts its own investigations into ethical matters.
The core principles of these different review boards are
essentially the same. However, important differences remain, as
the different boards have different priorities, concerns, past
experience, and approach to the practical dilemmas. For
example, research that may seem unfamiliar (or even intrusive)
in the realm of legal research might be considered by a social
science or medical ethics board to be standard practice, and
accordingly judged along differing standards.
The lack of a coherent research ethics review
infrastructure creates particular obstacles for interdisciplinary
projects. Indeed, some of the ethical considerations are
inherently in tension with each other, and with other, legal
principles, such as data protection law. For example, under data
protection law researchers are charged with strictly controlling
and limiting the sharing of personal data with others. In
contrast, research ethics often encourage researchers to share
research data widely as 'open data'.7 1 Thus, norms of scientific
integrity and transparency can conflict with the legally and
ethically necessary protection of the privacy of the respondents.
To illustrate: the ethical guidelines of the Amsterdam
School of Communication Research state that:
The data that are gathered in the course of the
research are not passed on to third parties
(neither published nor disclosed in conversations
or mutual consultation) in such a way that allows
the results or other findings to be traced back to
individual test subjects. An exception to this is
research in which the results of earlier research
are presented as a criterion for selecting test
subjects. In this case, the data are encrypted as
securely as possible when exchanged, and they are
never disclosed to anyone other than the
individuals involved in conducting the research.
Of course, in such cases the data are anonymized
after they are collected, and the resulting
publications and suchlike always use anonymous
data. 72
71 See generally Zuiderveen Borgesius, Van Eechoud, and Gray, supra note 57.
72 Department of Communication Science University of Amsterdam Ethics
Committee, Ethical Review for Research at the Department of Coimnication
Science, UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM (Sept. 5, 2013), htp! perma cc/6MX7-
86RG.
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In line with the legal requirements, researchers are
responsible for securing the privacy of the test subjects under all
circumstances. But pseudonymization does not provide
sufficient protection of their privacy. Hence, to comply with EU
law, we must take additional measures to safeguard the privacy
of our research participants.73
Yet, to take these additional steps to ensure the privacy
of the respondents could conflict with norms of scientific
integrity and transparency. Scientists are told to be as
transparent and verifiable as possible regarding data collection
and data analysis. This line of thought suggests that all raw data
should be stored in a repository accessible for peer reviewers who
want to check the validity and reliability of the research. The
current open access approach to science further advocates that
research data should be made openly accessible. For example,
the Netherlands Code of Conduct for Scientific Practice of the
Association of Universities in the Netherlands (VSNU)
expressively highlights the aspect of verifiability of results and
data. It requires not only that 'raw research data are stored for
at least five years.'74 . The code also demands that the raw data
are made available to other scientific practitioners at request,
and done so in a way 'that they can be consulted at a minimum
expense of time and effort'75 - requirements that contradict the
demands from data protection law to minimize and restrict the
sharing of raw, non-anonymized data with third parties.
Therefore, researchers on the one hand face an increasing
pressure to adhere to high transparency standards, while on the
other hand, face ever-stronger calls to strengthen privacy
protection and limit public data sharing that could violate the
privacy of participants.76
c) Other legal regimes
In the above analysis we have focused primarily on the
challenges for research that arise from privacy and data
protection regulation. Although it would exceed the scope of this
publication to analyze them in greater depth, many other areas
73 Recent research in the field of market research has come to similar conclusions,
see, e.g. Daniel Nunan & MariaLaura Di Domenico, Market Research and the
Ethics of Big Data, 55 INT. J. MARK. RES. 2-13 (2013).
74 The Netherlands Code of Conduct for Scientific Practice, ASSOCIATION OF
UNIVERSITIES IN THE NETHERLANDS 7 (2012), https://perma.cc/QFV3-AGLF.
75 Id.
76 For a recent review of securing the privacy of participants in United States
medical research, see Bradley Malin, David Karp & Richard H. Scheuermann,
Technical and Policy Approaches to Balancing Patient Privacy and Data
Sharing in Clinical and Translational Research, 58 J. INVESTIG. MED. 11-18
(2010). On the balance between data privacy and open data, see Zuiderveen
Borgesius, Van Eechoud, and Gray, supra note 57.
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pose issues for researchers investigating algorithms, and for our
research in particular. One such area is intellectual property
protection. Part of our research design is to collect data from
websites, such as news websites or social network websites.
Under certain conditions, these websites can be subject to
additional protections under intellectual property law. One
example would be the so-called database right, which protects
substantial investment hat has been made into the collection of
data.7 7 The decision of whether database rights apply to a
website, which would permit the website owner to prohibit
scraping and copying content from the website, is subject to a
case-by-case evaluation.7 8 Database rights, however, also
provide for a research exception.79 In Europe, a new copyright
law exemption for text and datamining for scientific research
has recently been proposed.8 0
Another recent development that has gone widely
unnoticed by the European algorithm research community is the
adoption of a new directive that fortifies the protection of trade
secrets in Europe.8 1 The directive defines trade secrets as
"information which ... is secret in the sense that it is not ...
generally known among or readily accessible to persons within
the circles that normally deal with the kind of information in
question; . . . has commercial value because it is secret; . . . [and]
has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances,
by the person lawfully in control of the information, to keep it
secret."82 Arguably, algorithms can fall under that definition. If
they do, the holder of a trade secret can prohibit any
unauthorized access to, appropriation of, or copying of the
77 See Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 March
1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases 1996 O.J. (L 77), 27.3.
78 The authors wish to thank Marco Caspers for pointing this out. For further
details on the situation under which database rights could apply, see Triaille,
Jean-Paul, J&6rme de Meefis D'Argenteuil, & Am6lie de Franequen, Study on
the Legal Framework of Text and Data Mining (TDM), DE WOLF & PARTNERS
(March, 2014), https://perma.cc/FXF3-RNWC; Hargreaves, Jan, Lucie
Guibault, Christian Handke, Peggy Valcke, Bertin Martens, Ros Lynch, et. al,
Standardisation in the Area of Innovation and Technological Development,
Notably in the Field of Text and Data Mining: Report from the Expert Group,
EUROPEAN COMMISSION - DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR RESEARCH AND
INNOVATION (2014), https://perma.cc/3BA2-AXQZ.
79 See supra note 77, art. 6. See also, Triaille, de Meeus & Franequen, supra note
78, at 79-80.
80 See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of The Council
on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, art. 3, COM (2016) 0593 final
(Sept. 14, 2016), https://perma.cc/5YN7-BPNF.
81 See Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
8 June 2016 on the Protection of Undisclosed Know-How and Business
Information (Trade Secrets) Against Their Unlawful Acquisition, use and
disclosure (Text with EEA relevance), O.J. (L 157), 15.6.
82 Id. art. 2 (1).
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materials from which the secret can be deduced.83 Interestingly,
the directive provides for an exemption for journalists, but not
academics.84
Finally, is important to realize that website owners also
have the means to regulate what is permitted or not permitted
on their websites, in the form of community guidelines and
terms of use. This creates an additional hurdle. Some sites are
more permissive of using parts of the side for research (e.g.
Twitter)85 than others (e.g. Facebook).86 The varied overall
picture creates additional legal uncertainty for researchers.
Another source of uncertainty is whether and under which
conditions researchers are bound to the terms of use at all.87
4. Panel constraints and organizational limitations
We also have to consider how certain organizational
limitations and practical realities may affect the study results.
As we discussed earlier, one of the key components in a
distributed/collaborative audit approach is having access to the
right mix and number of respondents, who are willing to share
their browsing behavior. It is obvious that in this case the usual
convenience samples and self-managed approaches88 will be
insufficient. Therefore, we cooperate with a professional
research organization, which manages a large enough panel that
is representative of the Dutch population along key
sociodemographic variables, such as age, education, income, etc.
The advantages of working with a professional research panel
are obvious: respondents are used to being surveyed, there is a
plethora of data available on them from previous surveys, the
research organization fulfills important tasks, such as
recruitment, panel management, design and communication,
etc. These advantages, however, come at the additional cost of
needing to account for the considerations of both the panel
participants and the interests of the research organization.
83 Id. art. 4 (2)(a).
84 Id. art. 5.
85 Twitter Terms of Service, TWITTER, https://perma.cc/3Z4H-RFWV (last visited
January 22, 2017).
86 Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, https://perma.cc/54MC-
V8NE (last visited January 22, 2017).
87 See e.g. Triaille, de Meeus and Franequen, supra note 78 at 73-74.
88 Many social science studies rely on "convenience samples" -- in other words
respondents who are cheap and easy to access, such as college students,
respondents recruited on the internet, or paid for via online collaboration
platforms, such as Amazon Turk. While such samples are cheap, and require
no third party to manage the respondents, the reliability of these studies are
severely limited by the lack of representativity, missing (sociodemographic,
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As previously discussed, securing informed consent from
our panelists is not simply an organizational requirement.
Informing our participants clearly and comprehensively about
what we plan to observe, what kind of sensitive personal
information we collect, and how we secure and store their data
is both a legal and ethical obligation. But this obligation has far-
reaching consequences on the practical level.
First, we face the issue of how to explain highly complex
technical, legal, and ethical issues in simple and straightforward
terms so it remains accessible for the average Dutch internet
user. However, the more clearly we explain what we do, the
lower the participation rate might be, especially among the more
privacy-conscious respondents. If privacy-sensitive individuals
do not join the research with the plug-in, our sample group may
be biased. While our legal and ethical obligations dictate that
panel participants be constantly aware if and when they are
under observation, this awareness is unfortunately less than
desirable from a research perspective, where we expect people to
behave more naturally when they forget that they are being
observed.
Most companies solve this problem of informed consent
by burying the more controversial clauses in the fine print of the
Terms of Service. Such an approach breaches data protection
law,89 and is not an option in our case. Instead, we have few
other alternatives than to be as transparent, intelligible, and
comprehensive as possible about our goals, methods, and
safeguards. Various tools are employed to achieve this: a well-
designed consent form, and radical transparency in our
interactions with participants.
Organizational considerations can also affect the
outcome of the study. Our research partner organization that
manages the panel expects its reputational and institutional
considerations to be taken seriously. The organization's concerns
are partly overlapping with ours, in terms of reputation, data
security, legal compliance, etc. In addition, the company rightly
wants to prevent anything that might negatively affect their
long-term investment in their panel, by, for example inducing
churn, higher non-response rates, loss of trust, etc. Having
strong incentives to err on the side of caution, their
organizational concerns oblige us to impose an extra layer of
personal data filters, which remove information that we can
89 See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 15/2011 on the
definition of consent, supra note 67 at 35 ("The information must be provided




Bodo et al.: Tackling the Algorithmic Control Crisis -the Technical, Legal, an
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
Tackling the Algorithmic Control Crisis
legally collect, but may identify respondents, such as home
addresses, or email addresses. .
V. BALANCING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND
SOCIETAL NEEDS IN RESEARCH INTO
ALGORITHMIC AGENTS: SOME LESSONS LEARNED
As the previous Part demonstrated, the process of
designing a research regime for "monitoring the algorithms" is
extraordinarily fraught with practical, legal and ethical
dilemmas. The legal principle of data minimization conflicts
with a researcher's desire to collect massive amounts of data.
The purpose limitation principle makes it harder for a
researcher to remain flexible in a quickly changing environment,
where new, unexpected developments are expected to appear at
any moment. Data protection law's rules about data retention,
security, and safety may conflict with research ethics on
transparency and accountability. And the obligations to acquire
informed consent may compromise some research objectives,
even when informing users has limited effect as a privacy
protection measure.90
In the following section, we develop some suggestions on
how to solve the legal and ethical challenges discussed in the
previous Section. We suggest in the following pages that
addressing the legal and ethical dilemmas requires a multi-
tiered approach that combines transparency with technical and
organizational measures. It is our hope that these
recommendations contribute to a growing conversation on ways
to conduct responsible research into algorithms and
personalized experience cocoons.
A. Designing ethical research: transparency
Transparency and informed consent have long been
regarded as the main lines of defense in privacy protection.
However, there is growing criticism of this approach. For
instance, even when an organization fully discloses how it uses
personal data, individuals may not be able to understand all the
information provided to them. Individuals may not foresee the
possible consequences of disclosing data. And even if individuals
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understood all the information an organization provided, they
might not act upon it.91
Nevertheless, transparency should be a key element in
efforts to minimize risks and harms associated with research.
Being transparent about what data researchers collect - and to
what end - is an expression of the respect for the autonomy of
the user, and thereby also an ethical requirement. But
transparency is also an element of accountability. By providing
specific information about processes and conduct, users and
third parties will be able to measure actors against what they
promised to do or not to do. And being transparent also forces
those collecting and processing the data to think carefully about
the "whys" as well as the "whats". We suggest some guiding
principles regarding transparency below.
1. Informed consent and transparency
As noted, under EU law in "informed consent" is likely
the only viable legitimate legal basis to guide our research,
regardless of scholarly criticism of consent as a privacy
protection measure. Hence, we suggest that the form and
content of the consent form should be of crucial importance in
research design.
The preparation of the documents which inform research
participants about the depth and scope of our data collection
activities, and which asks them to consent to these activities,
gave us the opportunity to reuse our insights from research into
transparency in general, and informed consent in particular.92
The legally (and ethically) appropriate form of acquiring
informed consent may, however, conflict with other aspects of
the research. A consent request that is too detailed may confuse
or even scare panelists. For example, based on the feedback from
our research partner in charge of the panel about the length and
complexity of our initial consent form, we were forced to rethink
the presentation and wording of the text, without compromising
on the content.93
91 See generally Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, What can behavioral
economics teach us about privacy, in DIGITAL PRIVACY: THEORY, TECHNOLOGIES
AND PRACTICES 363-77 (Alessandro Acquisti et al. eds., 2007); ZUIDERVEEN
BORGESIUS, supra note 68.; Natali Helberger, Form Matters: Informing
Consumers Effectively, SSRN (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2351791.
92 This is an example where legal research can be relevant not only for academics,
policy makers, and stakeholders, but can also provide insights for the actual
process of doing research itself.
93 Designing a revised and better structured consent form is no trivial task, and
one that took up more research time than anticipated. Part of that effort was
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We developed a more general "privacy notice" for our
website that explains what the project is about, which research
questions we look into, what kinds of data we collect, how we use
the data, whether we share the data, and how we secure the
data.9 4 Sharing detailed information about the research with
users is not only a matter of compliance.95 Clear information is
also a matter of respect for the user and a means to secure the
users' active cooperation. Ideally, being open and clear about
what we do will have the effect of winning the users' trust, which
is indispensable for this project, and making them active
participants to the research, rather than merely research
subjects.
2. Data retention and transparency
It is difficult to find the right length of time for the data
retention period. Data protection law's storage limitation
principle requires that data be deleted as soon as possible if they
are no longer necessary.96 On the other hand, scientific and
ethical norms increasingly dictate that underlying data are
shared to enable review and reuse.
Similar conflicts currently play out on an ad-hoc basis,
and they point to a need for a more general, systematic approach
to resolving conflicting ethical goals. Having said that, there is
a long tradition of research that involves sensitive data, and
there are alternatives to full access to the data that safeguard
both the privacy of the participants and transparency of the
research conducted. One such alternative is that the access to
highly sensitive raw data be safeguarded by an ethics
committee.9 7 In practice, this means that if during the peer
review process a reviewer requires access to the data in order to
evaluate whether the results have been obtained correctly, the
reviewer contacts the ethics committee which ensures that the
data are not shared with any other parties and only the data
required for the request are made available. Research
institutions should explore the feasibility of similar solutions.
3. Transparency as encouraging dialogue
also to cooperate together with an UX designer, and experiment with
alternative means of informing potential participants, such as using video.
These are research costs that are typically not accounted for in initial budget
calculations, but the efforts needed to comply with technical and ethical
standards certainly deserve a place in the budgets for research proposals.
94 See the privacy notice at https://robin.personalised-communication.net/.
95 See Data Protection Directive art. 10.
96 See Part IV.B.2.a.ii, supra.
97 See, for example, the procedure recommended by academic publisher PLOS I
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Finally, the public discussion about the use of data
analytics, algorithms, and their influence on fundamental rights
and values such as privacy, freedom of expression, personal
autonomy, or the right to non-discrimination is still very much
in flux. Often, it is not only companies, regulators, or
governments that do not know the right way to discuss these
deep issues, but scholars as well. Transparency has a role to play
in this debate. One way of dealing with this dynamic is to make
the choices, conflicts, and possible solutions as clear and
accessible as possible. This is a goal of this paper as well: to
cultivate scholarly debate about how to research the black box.
B. Deploying the principles in practice
A commitment to transparency may be key, but for
reasons explained above, informing users alone is likely an
inadequate response to the challenges that research into the
black box can pose. This is why we also implemented a number
of technical solutions to reduce the scope and depth of our
observation to a justifiable minimum, and made reasonable
efforts to discard information that is highly personal, sensitive,
or non-essential for our study.
1. Whitelists
We decided to limit the amount of captured data by
restricting our observations to a relatively small set of websites,
which are relevant to our original topics of personalization in
news, commerce and health. For this reason the browser plugin
routes the browser traffic through the transparent proxy only if
the visited website is on a pre-defined whitelist.
To include a website in the whitelist, researchers should
provide a detailed description,9 8 which provides not just the
practical and theoretical justifications for inclusion, but also the
risks of collecting unwanted, sensitive, personal information
from that website. These inclusion requests should then be
approved by the joint ethical review board, described in the next
Section.
Providing justification and explanation for the inclusion
of a website in the whitelist has four benefits. First, a
justification for the observed websites helps to comply with the
legal obligation of data minimization. Second, justifying
inclusion on the whitelist forces us to precisely define why we
98 See Annex 1: Justification form for website whitelisting.
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want to observe user interaction on each particular website.
Third, it allows us to inform participants about what we do and
why, as participants are able to consult the explanations online.
Finally, we hope that through this public information, users are
more willing to trust us as we communicate that we do not collect
information indiscriminately, and that we avoid observing
particularly sensitive websites such as the websites of banks,
doctors, and other highly-personal pages.
We organize the websites on the whitelists into specific
categories, such as Dutch language news websites, Dutch price
comparison websites, and international news websites.99 This
category-based approach is important for several reasons. As we
expected several hundred websites to be whitelisted, such
categories help us to present this overwhelming amount of
information in a user-friendly manner, which hopefully
translates into well-informed users and contributes to high
consent rates00 . By defining such categories, and by limiting the
number of categories and the number of URLs in each category,
we also aim to further comply with the data minimization
principle.
The whitelist approach comes with a number of
compromises, however. Restricting the scope of our observation
to a limited number of websites no doubt affects the effectiveness
of research. 101 The whitelists also introduces a certain amount of
inflexibility in the work process. It is extremely difficult to
predict which websites should be included in a whitelist. While
the periodic update of the whitelist is possible, each update to
the whitelist might require the renewal of the consent forms.
Finally, the entire process of designing the whitelists was very
time and resource intensive.
2. Filters
Data collected from whitelisted websites might still
contain information that we would like to avoid capturing, or
that has no relevance to our research objectives. To filter out
things like private correspondence, financial information, bank
account data, passwords, etc., we maintain a set of filters that
aim to remove such information from the captured data stream
before it reaches storage.
99 See Annex 2: Whitelisted website categories for examples.
100 In a preliminary study on the informed consent process we measured a 50%
consent rate. During the live recruitment the actual rate was slightly lower.
101 This will be more true for some areas (e.g. commerce) than for others (politics)
because the differences between the way profiling and targeting for behavioral
advertising or in the news media works.
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Despite our best efforts, the filter approach has
limitations. As filters operate on the body of data as defined by
the individual websites on the whitelist, any change to how a
particular website transfers a piece of information to be filtered
requires an update to the filter in question. This requires the
continuous maintenance of a large amount of filters, which are
prone to become obsolete at any subtle change in the website
without warning. Hence, filtering out all unwanted information
is not guaranteed. Nevertheless, the filters do help to minimize
the collection of unnecessary data.
3. Secure storage
Security is another important and challenging issue.
Data protection law and common sense requires us to keep user
data safe and secure. Ensuring data security can be difficult as
universities typically lack the technical infrastructure as well as
the expertise to provide industry-standard data security.
Our strategy to achieve reasonable levels of data security
had several components. First, we decided to involve the Dutch
national research computing infrastructure provider, "SURF". 102
Since they provide data storage and processing services to
several other privacy sensitive research projects, such as health
and genomics research, they have the expertise we require. In
the light of the current concerns about data transfers, the strict
requirements about data security in data protection law, and the
recent judgment of the European Court of Justice invalidating
the Safe Harbor for US-EU data transfers, it is also important
that the data is stored and processed in an EU member state.103
On top of the secure infrastructure, we use strong encryption
technology every time data is stored or transferred.
C. Creating organizational safeguards
The third part of our strategy consists of a number of
organizational measures. First, we entered the obligatory data
processing agreements with our partner organizations.104
Beyond these minimum legal requirements we decided to closely
involve our partner organizations in the project governance. We
102 SURF is the collaborative ICT organization for Dutch higher education and
research. It offers scientists in the Netherlands access to state-of-the-art
computing facilities.
103 See Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Protection Comm'r (2015). For
commentary, see Christopher Kuner, Reality and Illusion in EUData Transfer
Regulation Post Schrems, 18 GERMAN L. J. (forthcoming 2017).
104 See Data Protection Directive art. 17(3).
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set up two bodies to deal with unforeseen issues: a working
group on privacy and ethics, and a privacy steering committee.
The working group on privacy and ethics consists of a
number of members of the project team. Their main task is to
ensure compliance of the Personalized Communications Project
with legal and ethical requirements. In addition, the working
group is in charge of the operational aspects of legal compliance,
including managing the consent declaration and its
documentation; monitoring ongoing compliance of personal data
handling; responding to complaints and react to other
information; handling third party requests for access to the
datasets and communicating decisions to the research team and
the research partner. By making compliance a separate
management ask and dedicating personnel-power to this, we
aim to guarantee continuous attention for matters of privacy and
data protection within the project.
In addition to the working group, we set up the privacy
steering committee, with an equal number of members from
CentERdata (our research partner), the University of
Amsterdam, and an external member familiar with issues of
privacy and research ethics. This body acts as a joint ethics
advisory board, with extensive veto powers over all of the issues
that involve the research panel, including such key components
of the research as the form and content of the consent
declaration and privacy notice; the technical specifications of the
observation infrastructure; key features of the whitelisted
websites, such as the generic categories; the data management
policy of the collected data; and possible complaints by the
survey participants.
We devised these technical, organizational and
procedural frameworks in response to the concerns we identified
during the design of our research methodology. It should be
noted that the most effective frameworks will be in a constant
state of flux, as new challenges force actors to provide adequate
responses. Nevertheless, these safeguards offer a reliable
framework to address unforeseen problems.
VI. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A VISION ON
RESPONSIBLE BIG DATA RESEARCH
In the dawn of the information age Isaac Asimov, the
science fiction writer, formulated three law of robotics.105 Half a
105 (1) A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human
being to come to harm. (2) A robot must obey orders given it by human beings
except where such orders would conflict with the First Law. (3) A robot must
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century later, having autonomous artificial agents around us is
no longer science fiction. Despite the ubiquity of these agents,
we are yet to have anything remotely similar to Asimov's three
simple laws. The main reason for that is that autonomous
algorithmic agents are not what we imagined them to be. They
are not the huge, shiny, metal robots, or standalone machines
with superhuman strength who have the potential to cause
physical harm to humans in various local contexts. Instead,
algorithmic agents operate on an immaterial level; they are
networked and interconnected; and rather than being engaged
in local, one-on-one interactions with individuals, they operate
on planetary scale, simultaneously affecting the lives of billions.
Despite, or, perhaps because of, these differences, our societies
may still need rules to avoid, or at least minimize, potential
harm from our algorithmic agents. Yet we still have no idea how
to translate Asimov's simple and straightforward instructions
into something applicable to our current context.
To arrive at solutions, we first need to be able to answer
some fundamental questions on how algorithms and humans co-
shape society. How do algorithmic agents improve our individual
and communal lives, and how do we encourage such
developments? What are the possible injuries - through their
design, operation, decisions, or their negligence - that
algorithmic agents can cause to human individuals and
communities? What kind of values do we encode into algorithmic
agents? Who encodes those values, and at which points? How do
we, as a society, teach our values to algorithmic agents, and how
do those get reflected back to us? How do we detect if something
is going astray? Do researchers have a public obligation to do so?
How do we assign individual and communal responsibilities and
accountabilities in this domain? How do we account for the
plurality of often contradicting values that algorithmic agents
need to comply with? What kind of informal practices, norms,
professional ethics and codes of conducts - and what kinds of
legal instruments - are developing around the existence of
algorithmic agents? Where is this piecemeal, bottom-up
regulatory scaffolding lacking? Where does it need top-down,
planned reinforcement?
To answer any of these questions, first we need to know
what is actually happening as humans and algorithmic agents
interact. We need to be able to observe these interactions as they
take place; to be able to gather empirical evidence on those
interactions so we can start exploring their effects. Without this
protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the
First or Second Law. IsAAc Asimov, I, ROBOT 37 (1950).
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knowledge, any answer to the questions above must remain
speculative.
Yet, the acquisition of this insight into human-
algorithmic agent interactions poses serious challenges and
paradoxes. In order to fully understand the effects and
implications of algorithmic profiling and targeting, it is
necessary to engage in the collection of large amounts of data,
and thereby behave similarly to the companies whose behavior
and impact we research. This means that researchers may be
complicit in any intrusion into the privacy and personal data of
their research subjects. Should ethical norms and legal
requirements render such research impossible? And should
different conditions apply for research that is being done behind
closed doors at commercial companies, or by academic
researchers, who operate under elaborate ethical demands of
transparency and accountability?10 6
Doing research and advancing knowledge and science are
not goals that, in themselves, justify violating the rules that
were meant to protect privacy and related rights, or violating the
values that are the subject of our research. But without the right
tools, we as a community of scientists, citizens, and humans lose
our ability to reflect on one of the most important developments
in the history of communication. And seeing the complexity of
algorithms and the challenge of understanding their effects on
users, society, and the values that our societies hold, it can be
argued that academic researchers, as (hopefully) independent
and skilled observers, have an important role in advancing
knowledge and understanding. 107
For research which relies on tools that gather large
quantities of potentially highly sensitive data on a relatively
large group of participants, being aware of the conflicts and the
stakes at hand is the first step towards developing more
responsible methodologies. The next step is to devise solutions
that make the use of these tools safe. While most of the solutions
will be different from project to project, we hope that this
contribution offers some more generalizable approaches a well.
We believe that one ideal long term solution would be to
set up representative national panels which would allow full
insight into their members' online behavior for research
purposes. As, for example, Nielsen tracks TV viewing, similar
institutions, both public and/or private, would enable insights
106 The GDPR has a very broad research exception. See Part IV.B.3.c., supra.
107 Or as the GDPR has framed it: "For scientific or historical research purposes
or statistical purposes, the legitimate expectations of society for an increase of
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into how a representative sample of individual internet users
interact with various online services.1 08 We believe that such
oversight, enabled and overseen by independent hird parties, is
essential to gather knowledge on the developments of our
societies.
But lacking such a public "looking glass" infrastructure
at the present, we have tried to emulate something similar, as
closely as the current legal and ethical constraints allowed us.
We have to rely on an informed consent approach, seeking
individuals who are willing to participate in our research for
their own, individual reasons. But rather than trying to exploit
the fact that individuals are susceptible to consent to anything,
without giving a serious second thought to what they click to
agree on, we decided to take a more difficult path. This path
relies on being fully transparent about both the scope and depth
of our activities, in combination with technical and
organizational safeguards. But securing informed consent and
doing so in a way that is actually meaningful is only one part of
the solution. The other part of the solution is to build ethical and
normative safeguards into the actual research environment.
This approach, and the subsequent system of technological,
ethical, and organizational safeguards we have built, may serve
as an example that others can also rely on.
Our approach comes at a cost: by informing panelists
properly about our data collection, researchers risk losing their
trust. By limiting our tool to a limited number of websites on a
whitelist, we not only forgo some of the technical potential but
probably also limited the usefulness and validity of our research.
And we have to re-purpose significant amounts of research time
to designing the data management strategies, justification
forms, governance structures, and the like. Funders should
provide adequate financial resources to make research legally
compliant, and ethically responsible. And society must decide
under what conditions the public and scientific interest in more
algorithmic transparency justifies conflict, for example with
restrictive terms of use of (commercial) exploiters of algorithms
but also intellectual property law and data protection.
This brings us to more fundamental issues. One is the
question of when the potential (monetary, but also social and
individual) costs of such a monitoring infrastructure outweigh
its potential positive contribution to science. This is a difficult
question to answer because both costs and benefits are difficult
108 See NIELSEN, https://perma.cc/FZ5N-BVE2. While Nielsen is a commercial
entity, offering its metrics on the market for a fee, the research panel we are
collaborating with is essentially financed by the Dutch public, and thus access
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to quantify, and to do so would require even more research along
similar terms.
Possible lessons could be learned from the principle of
proportionality that applies, for instance, to governments, but
also in the data protection context. A leading principle for the
activities of governments is that where there are lighter,
potentially less invasive alternatives, those should be chosen.
For researchers this could mean that when choosing between
different methods to research algorithms, their potential
invasiveness and strain on research subjects needs to be an
important consideration, in addition to the usual inquiries of
potential effectiveness in answering a particular research
question.
Another issue is whether there is a need for society to
agree on some principles of responsible research into the
algorithmic society. This question is perhaps controversial
because such principles could interfere with academic freedom
and the role that academics play in a democratic society. And
yet, because of their societal role, academics have an equally
important task in bringing light into matters that would
otherwise not easily be exposed to the public. Formulating such
principles could be a method ensuring that academics engage in
research in an ethical, publically accountable way. Under the
General Data Protection Regulation, using lawfully collected
personal data in scientific research is foreseen if this adheres to
recognized ethical standards for scientific research, in other
words principles for academic research. Research guidance could
take the form of broadly accepted (and ideally dynamic)
standards, e.g. developed by researchers, in cooperation with
data protection authorities, judges, ethicists, etc.109
In addition, there could be a role for governments to
clarify and improve research exceptions in data protection,
intellectual property, and contract law. Exceptions should
account for the fact that doing such research can often be in the
public interest. A clearer distinction should be made between
academic, publicly accessible research (research that is
contributing to ending the algorithmic control crisis) and
research that is taking place within companies, and behind
closed doors (potentially further contributing to the control
crisis). Lawmakers should also more clearly define the
109 For example, in the Netherlands, the leading universities in the area of data
science research have formed a multi-disciplinary coalition consisting of
computer scientists, legal scholars, ethicists, economists, communications
scientists, psychologists, etc. to develop together principles and best practices
of responsible data science research, the Responsible Data Science (RDS)
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conditions under which organizational and technical safeguards
are adequate and sufficient.
Data protection law, the General Data Protection
Regulation, and even copyright law currently acknowledge the
societal role of research in algorithms. Well-balanced research
exceptions play an important role in this. But we have also
identified instances in which the requirements of research in
algorithms have been ignored, such as in the case of trade
secrecy protection in Europe, or the terms of use of the very
companies that use the algorithms that researchers try to
investigate. This is a problem not easily solved. It is true that
commercial companies are investing significant amounts of
money in technology development and at the same time
benefiting from the fundamental freedom to conduct business
and protect their property. It is also true that some of these
technologies are likely to have a significant impact on society,
and society still needs to learn what these impacts are.
Algorithms are an example of this. Should it be possible that
research into algorithms is legally impossible because of terms
of use? Does such a situation create information asymmetries
that may not only affect individual users, but society at large? If
so, should there be limits to contractual freedom not only in the
interest of individual users, but society and academics to the
extent that they do research to advance transparency? These are
relevant questions, and we suggest that researchers continue
puzzling about them.
As a final point: ways of conducting responsible research
into algorithmic society should be acknowledged as a research
topic in itself. Much of the research into algorithms, but also into
data protection and privacy law, is directed at uncovering the
ways in which algorithms can potentially comply or conflict with
fundamental rights and values, such as privacy, non-
discrimination, and freedom of expression. The results from this
research should be used not only to improve laws and demand
more societally acceptable algorithms. They should also be used
to help researchers design better and more responsible research.
In other words, there is currently no ready-made recipe
for doing research into algorithms and society. But we hope that
our paper may contribute to solving the algorithmic control crisis
by outlining the wider technical, legal, and methodological
challenges that accompany attempts to systematically observe
and aggregate the behavior of algorithmic agents.
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VII. ANNEX 1: JUSTIFICATION FORM FOR WEBSITE
WHITELISTING
Draft form for websites included in the whitelist
General
URL [Enter the URL of the website]
Alias: [Enter the URL of an alias to the
website]
Generic [Enter the relevant generic No. [count
category category within which the the
website shall be included on website
the whitelist] on the
I I whitelist]
Reason for [Insert a generic but precise reason for
inclusion in inclusion of the website on the whitelist in
the whitelist order to answer which research question]
Features of the website
SSL [Does the website or subparts of it use
encryption and when, e.g. whether especially
sensitive personal data is transferred, e.g.
payment data]
Bi- or pluri- [Does the website contain non-public, bi- and
lateral plurilateral communications, such as groups,
commu- messaging, chats?]
nications
If yes [Add URLs of pages where such
communications takes place]
Includes [Does the website include personal data of
data of third individuals external to the participants who
parties have agreed to the research? E.g. user-
generated content.]
The following categories of personal data involved?
user name/ [Yes/ no]
password
If yes [Add URLs of pages where such data are
involved]
sensitive [Yes/ no, e.g. health, political beliefs, sexual
personal orientation]
data
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If yes [Add URLs of pages where such data are
involved]
other [Could there be other especially sensitive
personal data, e.g. psycho quizzes]
If yes [Add URLs of pages where such data are
involved]
Measures
[Insert description of the measures to limit intrusions into
privacy, protection of sensitive personal data, communications
secrecy and rights of third parties]
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political informuation




Political parties and other entities
Reason for inclusion in the whitelist:
Political communication is increasingly tailor-made.
Parties and candidates focus their efforts on convincing opinion
leaders and undecided voters, those increasingly few upon whom
the outcome of an election hinges. Two important internet-
related developments prompted this change in political
communication. First, on a practical level, there are more and
more entities that are able to observe us and collect data on
various aspects of our behavior (and thus our preferences),
ranging from credit card analyses to personalized online
services. A whole data broker industry has developed based on
this information, selling highly detailed dossiers on the majority
of individuals in developed societies.
Second, the proliferation of social media services offer
better targeting opportunities. Our highly detailed online
profiles on social media websites enable even better micro-
targeting opportunities for anyone willing to pay for the
opportunity.
Both of these developments promise huge payoffs for
political campaigns. Political parties in the United States are
using microtargeting to maximize the impact of campaign
spending. Experts expect similar developments to unfold in
Europe in the near future.
Despite the entry of political entities into the data
domain, it is unclear how these developments affect the
foundations of our democratic system. We lack basic information
on how the personalization of political communication takes
place: how political parties utilize dataveillance, how they
communicate online with citizens, and/or to what extent and to
what effect they personalize their efforts.
Hence, we would like to include the websites of political
parties for three reasons
Vol. 19
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a) To find out to what degree political parties use their
own communication tools to target potential voters by
showing them personalized information.
b) To observe the breadth of information citizens receive
in a political campaign online. Are they primarily
informed through news sources that might serve
them personalized limited information, or do they
also get information from the political parties
themselves?
c) How changes in the news consumption of a user affect
political engagement. For example, did users that
started to use primarily personalized news media of a
particular ideological leaning visit political party
homepages more often?
Necessary extra data protection measures:
Personal data of third parties need to be filtered in the
discussion and comment sections.
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